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A Spatial Analysis of Agricultural Land 
Prices in Bavaria 
Paul Feichtinger and Klaus Salhofer∗ 
Factor Markets Working Paper No. 50/June 2013 
1. Introduction 
The importance of land for farming is beyond doubt. The determinants of land value 
formation were therefore an important research issue more than 200 years ago (Smith, 1776; 
Ricardo, 1817; von Thünen, 1842) and have continued to be so since (Lloyd, 1920; Bean, 
1938; Scofield, 1957; Klinefelter, 1973; Robison et al., 1985; Shaik et al., 2005) and the matter 
is not yet fully resolved. Empirical analyses of land prices became more common from the 
1960s on. At the same time, the question of the extent to which governmental payments 
capitalise into agricultural land gained importance. In empirical work, the relevant 
explanatory variable is realised governmental payments. But as the influence of payments on 
land price is based on expected values rather than observed values (e.g. Goodwin et al., 
2003), one faces an endogeneity problem due to expectation errors. Goodwin et al. (2010) 
solve this problem by using lagged values of government payments as instruments. In 
addition to measurement errors introduced through expectation errors, endogeneity in land 
price studies may be caused by omitted variables or simultaneous determination of the 
dependent variable and at least one RHS variable.  
Until about a decade ago, the spatial dimension of land use and land markets was ignored in 
land price studies. Land and its specific characteristics such as non-movability lead to a 
limited spatial extension of farms and to regional land markets. Spatially closer land markets 
interact with higher intensity than more distant ones. Moreover, in econometric applications, 
explanatory variables (e.g. precipitation indices) are often fitted to the dimension of the 
dependent variable land price by spatial interpolation, which can lead to spatially correlated 
error terms (Anselin, 2002). Hardie et al. (2001) were one of the first to use a spatial error 
model to account for spatial autocorrelation in the disturbances. Patton and McErlean 
(2003) also used a spatial error model, while Huang et al. (2006) used a spatial lag model in 
analysing the determinants of Illinois land prices. 1  
First, we define the land sales price as an outcome of the interaction between supply and 
demand within an area and the interaction of land markets in neighbouring areas, similarly 
to Fingleton and Le Gallo (2008). Second, we apply a general spatial model, combining a 
spatial lag model and a spatial error model to account for spatial dependence and for spatial 
autocorrelation in the disturbances, to a dataset of more than 7,300 actual arm’s length sales 
transactions of agricultural land in Bavaria. Additionally, we account for endogeneity 
introduced by explanatory variables other than the spatially lagged dependent variable. 
According to Fingleton and Le Gallo (2008), this is usually ignored in econometric analysis. 
2. Method 
Following Fingleton and Le Gallo (2008), we model the observed agricultural land sales price 
in a specific area as the outcome of the interaction between land supply and demand in this 
                                                        
∗ Paul Feichtinger is a PhD student and Klaus Salhofer a professor in the Environmental Economics 
and Agricultural Policy Group at Technische Universität München (Paul.Feichtinger@tum.de). 
1 Extensive literature reviews on determinants of land prices are provided by Le Mouël (2003), 
Latruffe and Le Mouël (2009) and Feichtinger and Salhofer (2013).  
2 | FEICHTINGER & SALHOFER 
 
area and the interaction with land markets in neighbouring areas. Specifically, the quantity of 
agricultural land demanded in area i (qi) is modelled as a linear function,  
ݍ௜ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙ௣ ݌௜ ൅ ߙ௪ ෍ ௜ܹ௝
஽݌௝
௝ஷ௜
൅ ෍ ܽ௬ܣ௬,௜ ൅
௒
௬ୀଵ
߱௜ (1) 
where ݌௜ (݌௝) is the price of agricultural land in area i (j), ௜ܹ௝
஽ is a row standardised spatial 
weight matrix with zero elements for non-neighbours and zero elements in the diagonal, ܣ௬,௜ 
are Y demand shifting variables such as soil quality or distance to the nearest market, ߱௜ is a 
stochastic error term with ߱௜ ~ ݅݅݀ܰሺ0, ߪఠଶ ሻ and all α are coefficients to be estimated. In 
accordance with standard economic theory, we assume ߙ௣ ൑  0. High prices for land in area j, 
which is in close proximity to area i, will reduce demand for land in area j. As a consequence, 
some demand will be displaced from j to i. Hence, ݍ௜ is positively related to the weighted 
average of land prices in the surrounding areas ( ௜ܹ௝
஽݌௝) and ߙ௪  ൑ 0.  
Analogously, the supply of agricultural land (ݍ௜) in area i can be modelled as  
ݍ௜ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௣ ݌௜ ൅ ߚ௪ ෍ ௜ܹ௝
ௌ݌௝
௝ஷ௜
൅ ෍ ߚ௭ܤ௭,௜ ൅
௓
௭ୀଵ
ߞ௜ (2) 
where ௜ܹ௝
ௌ is again a row standardised spatial weight matrix, ܤ௭,௜ are Z supply-side shifters 
such as the share of rented land in a municipality,2 ߞ௜ is a stochastic error term with 
ߞ௜ ~ ݅݅݀ܰሺ0, ߪ఍
ଶሻ and all β are coefficients to be estimated. In accordance with standard 
economic theory, we assume ߚ௣ ൒ 0. In contrast to the demand side spill-over effect, we 
assume a negative influence of the weighted average prices in the surrounding areas ( ௜ܹ௝
ௌ݌௝) 
on the quantity supplied in area i (ݍ௜), because high prices in area j cause a displacement of 
supply from nearby i to j (ߚ௪ ൑ 0ሻ.  
Based on equations (1) and (2), and the simplifying assumption that ܹா ൌ ܹ஽ ൌ ܹௌ, we can 
derive a reduced form pricing equation  
݌௜ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛ௪ ෍ ௜ܹ௝
ா݌௝
௝ஷ௜
൅ ෍ ߛ௞ܺ௞,௜ ൅
௄
௞ୀଵ
ߝ௜ (3) 
where ܺ௞,௜ are K = Y + Z variables of demand and supply shifters. ߛ are coefficients to be 
estimated, with ߛ଴ ൌ
ఈబିఉబ
ఈ೛ାఉ೛
, ߛ௪ ൌ
ఈೢାఉೢ
ఈ೛ାఉ೛
, ߛ௞ ൌ
ఈ೤
ఈ೛ାఉ೛
 for demand shifters and ߛ௞ ൌ
ିఉ೥
ఈ೛ାఉ೛
 for 
supply shifters. Moreover, since ߱௜ ~ iidN(0,ߪఠଶ ) and ߞ௜ ~ iidN(0,ߪ఍
ଶ) it holds that ߝ௜ ൌ
ఉುఠ೔ି఍೔
ఈ೛ାఉ೛
 
~ iidN(0,ߪఌଶ). Equation (3) is recognisable as the well-known spatial lag model (Ord, 1975).  
Although equation (3) accounts for spatial dependence, the potential problem of spatial 
autocorrelation in the disturbances remains. One reason for this might be spatially 
autocorrelated omitted variables, an inherent problem in land price analysis. In overcoming 
this problem, spatial error processes are implemented into error terms, with the spatial 
autoregressive model (SAR) and the spatial moving average model (SMA) being the most 
common specifications. In the SAR model, an assumed shock in area i is gradually 
transmitted to all other areas, since the areas are all connected with each other to some 
degree (global autocorrelation). In contrast, a shock is transmitted only to neighbouring 
                                                        
2 Before selling the land, landowners often rent it out for some years. A larger share of rented land may 
indicate a high number of landowners willing to sell. 
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areas in the SMA model (local autocorrelation). Hence, the range of the effect is much 
smaller (Anselin, 2003). As it seems likely in the case of agricultural land markets that a 
shock in area i is transmitted to more distant units, we choose the SAR model for our error 
term. Moreover, this seems to be consistent with the (global) autoregressive process of our 
spatial lag formulation. 
Including a SAR model, the error term of equation (3) becomes 
ߝ௜ ൌ ߛ௘ ෍ ௜ܹ௝
ாߝ௝
௝ஷ௜
൅ ߭௜ , (4) 
where ߛ௘ is the spatial error coefficient to be estimated and ߭௜ is an uncorrelated error term ߭௜ 
~ iidN(0,ߪజଶ). While a spatial lag coefficient ߛ௪ has a direct interpretation, a SAR model is 
implemented to obtain unbiased estimates.3  
3. Data 
We utilise a comprehensive dataset of (almost) all arm’s length agricultural land sales 
transactions in Bavaria for the years 2001 (4,055) and 2007 (4,574). The dataset includes 
transaction-specific information on sales price, soil quality, plot size, municipality affiliation, 
and whether a public authority was involved as a seller or buyer. Farm take-overs by 
descendants are not captured in our data; the amount a successive farmer has to pay to other 
legal heirs as their compulsory portion of inheritance is usually considerably lower than the 
farm’s actual market value (van der Veen et al., 2002).  
From this dataset, we exclude plots already legally converted for housing development, land 
with a special usage such as excavation areas for gravel or sand, and land that also contains 
buildings. Furthermore, we try to exclude sales not primarily motivated by agricultural usage 
and therefore do not consider transacted plots smaller than 0.25 hectares. Such plots are 
more likely to inherit specific rights and easements (e.g. prospective non-agricultural land 
use) and this may result in price premia that are difficult to capture in our estimations given 
the information available. To account for other exceptional circumstances (e.g. agricultural 
land bought by non-farmers in a scenic area at a high premium, or fictitious purchases 
between closely related persons), we exclude transactions at prices lower (higher) than 2,000 
(110,324) €/ha.4 Additionally, we omit transactions with implausible values such as a soil 
quality index lower than 7 or higher than 85, or a price/soil quality ratio above 20.5 
With these restrictions, we are left with 7,369 total observations for the years 2001 (3,539) 
and 2007 (3,830). On average, sale transactions took place in about 1,200 of the 2,056 
Bavarian municipalities in each year. The shape of Bavarian municipalities and the location 
of municipalities where transactions took place in 2001 are shown in Figures 1a and 1b. At 
least one transaction took place in either 2001 or 2007 in 1,567 different municipalities. 
Table 1 shows that a plot of agricultural land sold for 22,642.32 €/ha (21,749.12 €/ha) in 
2001 (2007) on average. The dataset does not allow us to distinguish between arable land 
                                                        
3 LeSage (1999) and LeSage and Pace (2009) provide, among others, extensive reviews of different 
spatial models.  
4 Before excluding outliers, we observe an average sales price of 25,289 €/ha with a standard deviation 
of 28,345 €/ha. To define outliers, we use three standard deviations from the mean as an upper bound. 
Considering that defining the lower bound analogously would lead us to keep (non-plausible) negative 
values, one would assume zero to be an appropriate lower bound. To additionally exclude transactions 
with (exceptionally) low sales prices, we determine 2,000 €/ha instead of zero as a lower bound. After 
accounting for outliers, our average sales price decreases to 22,198 €/ha with a standard deviation of 
14,257 €/ha.  
5 An index system is used in Germany to indicate the soil quality of agricultural land. The point index 
ranges from zero to 100, with values for Bavaria of between 7 and 85 (Lfl, 2007). 
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and grassland. In 2001 (2007), public institutions such as municipalities were buyers in 22% 
(13%) of all transactions. Purchased plots are often dedicated to infrastructure development 
in the future or are similarly handed over to a landowner as compensation for some of his 
land being dedicated to developing infrastructure. Public institutions acted as sellers in 2.5% 
(3%) of the sale transactions. State and municipalities own agricultural land mostly for 
historical reasons, and this share accounts for transactions of such land as well of sales of 
plots left over from infrastructure development projects.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (after excluding outliers) 
    No.Obs* Mean SD Min Max 
      2001 
Sales price €/ha 3,539 22,642.32 14,332.16 2,044.20 102,260.10 
Public seller % 3,539 3.33 
   
Public buyer  % 3,539 21.87 
   
Soil quality rating pt. 3,539 45.19 13.07 7.18 84.00 
Size of transacted plot ha 3,539 1.67 2.26 0.25 73.44 
Distance to the next urban centre km 1,211 29.01 14.14 1.00 80.61 
Direct payments €/ha 1,211 261.28 92.21 7.36 469.03 
Share of rented agricultural area % 82 44.25 10.47 12.75 77.66 
Price of building plots €/m2 82 83.09 66.13 19.21 727.84 
Ratio building vs. agricultural land 
 
82 9.43 11.12 2.11 198.24 
  
  
2007 
Sales price €/ha 3,830 21,749.12 14,109.23 2,026.75 102,300.00 
Public seller % 3,830 2.45 
   
Public buyer  % 3,830 12.74 
   
Soil quality rating pt. 3,830 45.50 12.67 7.47 84.00 
Size of transacted plot ha 3,830 1.76 1.94 0.25 31.76 
Distance to the next urban centre km 1,196 29.00 14.62 1.00 72.49 
Direct payments €/ha 1,196 350.31 53.23 122.03 707.74 
Share of rented agricultural area % 86 51.38 9.96 19.26 78.17 
Price of building plots €/m2 86 71.74 50.01 16.07 331.17 
Ratio building vs. agricultural land 
 
86 18.15 20.92 2.58 252.84 
* A total of 7,369 transactions took place in 1,567 different municipalities and 92 different districts.  
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Figure 1. Bavarian municipalities (a) and municipalities where transactions took place in 
2001 (b) 
a) b) 
 
Source: Authors’ presentation. 
To broaden the scope of our analysis, we add information on the distance to the next urban 
centre at the municipality level as well as district averages of the share of rented agricultural 
land in relation to total agricultural land, the sales prices for building plots, and a ratio of 
building versus agricultural land. These variables account for regional differences in urban 
pressure and agricultural land market structure.6 The average shares of rented agricultural 
area (in total utilised agricultural area) at the district level vary from 13% to 78%. On average, 
a transacted plot had a size of about 1.70 ha. The variable helps to explain how economies of 
scale of larger plots might outweigh potentially greater difficulties in obtaining financing to 
purchase them. In addition, descriptive statistics reveal that prices of land for construction 
are, on average, 35 times higher than prices of agricultural land. We also add average direct 
payments in the respective municipality to account for the fact that agricultural subsidies 
may capitalise into land values to some extent. The first year of observation (2001) represents 
the time before the Fischler Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, and hence includes 
mainly coupled direct payments for area and animals. The second year (2007) is after the 
Fischler Reform, with decoupled single farm payments. On average across all municipalities, 
producers received approximately 261 €/ha/year in 2001 and 350 €/ha/year in 2007 as 
direct payments (either coupled or decoupled). Low averages in some municipalities, such as 
the minimum value of 7.36 €/ha (122 €/ha) in 2001 (2007), indicate a comparably high 
share of milk production, whereas high values (maximum of 469.03 €/ha in 2001 and 707.74 
€/ha in 2007) are a sign that arable farming in combination with intensive beef production is 
predominant.  
                                                        
6 It should be noted that mean and standard deviation of variables based on municipality and district 
averages are sample weighted because the 7,369 transactions are unequally distributed between 
municipalities. 
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4. Empirical Implementation 
One critical point in every spatial econometric analysis is the ex ante specification of the n x n 
spatial weights matrix. What defines neighbours, as well as the weights given to each 
neighbour, has to be determined exogenously. In our case, n is the number of agricultural 
land transactions in the particular year. Because a land transaction cannot be a neighbouring 
transaction of itself, diagonal elements of the matrix are zero as are elements for non-
neighbours. In contrast, elements for neighbours are non-zero. With regard to choosing 
weights of neighbours, two commonly used approaches are binary weights assigning a 1 to 
each neighbour and the inverse distance weight 1/d, where d is the distance between two 
units. While in the first approach all neighbours are weighted equally, geographically closer 
transactions would be weighted stronger than more distant transactions in the second 
approach. We use binary weights as we lack information on the exact location of a transacted 
plot within a municipality. For the same reason, we assume municipality centroids as the 
location of any transacted plot in a municipality.  
In defining the criteria for whether transactions are neighbours or not, we use two different 
approaches (Figures 2a and 2b).7 In the first, a transacted plot (area j) is a neighbour of the 
transacted plot in question (area i) if the municipality centroid (J) is within a circle of eight 
kilometres from the centroid of area i (I). This is depicted in the left panel of Figure 2. In 
some municipalities, multiple transactions take place in one year and since those 
transactions are clearly within a circle of eight kilometres, they are also neighbours. Though 
not necessarily closer in distance to the transaction in question, they are intuitively more 
closely connected, for example because the flow of information is probably highest within a 
municipality.  
Figure 2. Distance-based and Gabriel-based neighbour definition 
Source: Authors’ presentation. 
In the second approach, illustrated in the right panel of Figure 2, closed discs are drawn 
between municipality centroids. Areas i and j are considered neighbours if a closed disc 
between their centroids (I and J) contains no other centroids.8 K is not a neighbour of I under 
                                                        
7 Practical advice in defining neighbours and creating weight matrices can be found in Bivand et al. 
(2008). 
8 The second approach, called a Gabriel graph, was first discussed in Gabriel and Sokal (1969). For an 
application we refer to Bivand and Brunstad (2006).  
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either of the two definitions because (a) it is outside an eight kilometre circle, and (b) a closed 
disc between I and K contains J. When using a distance-based neighbour definition, about 20 
transactions per year have to be dropped from our sample due to a lack of neighbours. The 
reasons for this are generally a low number of sales transactions in the whole region or only 
one single transaction in a large municipality with the next municipalities’ centroids being 
further away than eight kilometres. An advantage of the second approach is that according to 
the definition, every area i has at least one neighbouring area j.  
Based on those two approaches, we derive two different row standardised weight matrices 
with every row summing to one, independent of the actual number of neighbours and 
whether weights are binary or (inverse) distances. This implies decreasing impacts of the 
single transaction with a rising number of neighbours. Moreover, a row standardised matrix 
is not symmetric and a transaction in area j may influence a transaction in area i differently 
from in the reverse case. Most importantly, a row standardised form allows to interpret the 
coefficient as the weighted average effect of land prices in the surrounding areas ( ௜ܹ௝
ா݌௝) on 
land prices in area i (݌௜).  
Although we have given some theoretical justification for a spatial lag model in Section 2, we 
also statistically test for spatial autocorrelation using a Moran’s I test and for spatial 
autoregressive processes in the dependent variable as well as the residuals using Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) tests. While in Moran’s I tests positive (negative) values indicate positive 
(negative) spatial autocorrelation, values close to zero indicate no autocorrelation. According 
to Table 2, ܪ଴ of no spatial autocorrelation is rejected in all our cases at the 99% level.9 To 
assess the specific form of spatial autocorrelation and to decide whether a spatial error or a 
spatial lag specification is more appropriate, LM tests are used most frequently. Burridge 
(1980) proposed a LM test for spatial autoregressive processes in the error term (ܪ଴: ߛ௘ ൌ 0ሻ, 
while Anselin (1988) proposed a LM test for spatial autoregressive processes in the 
dependent variable ሺܪ଴: ߛ௪ ൌ 0). The LM test results in Table 2 confirm spatial 
autoregressive processes in the residuals as well as the dependent variable. In such a case of 
rejecting both ܪ଴ of no spatial autocorrelation, the robust test versions can be used to 
determine which autoregressive process is predominant.10 Robust test version results confirm 
spatial autoregressive processes in the residuals as well as the dependent variable for all 
cases. Hence, Moran’s I and LM tests confirm (on empirical grounds) the use of a general 
spatial model as in equation (3) including a decomposed error term as in equation (4). 
Table 2. Testing for spatial autocorrelation and for spatial autoregressive processes for 
alternative spatial weight matrices and spatial dependence test results 
 2001 2007 
Weight matrix Distance based Gabriel Distance based Gabriel 
No. of observations 3539 3830 
No. of municipalities 1211 1196 
Average no. of links 15.32 18.50 16.06 21.07 
Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroskedasticity 
79.40 *** 111.59 *** 
Jarque – Bera test on normality 
of errors 
12.05 *** 85.99 *** 
Moran's I test 0.265 *** 0.246 *** 0.187 *** 0.155 *** 
LM error 1,166.80 *** 1,564.58 *** 663.97 *** 729.21 *** 
Robust LM error 142.64 *** 300.29 *** 55.43 *** 116.12 *** 
LM lag 1,052.77 *** 1,304.67 *** 681.85 *** 699.13 *** 
                                                        
9 A formula for a Moran’s I test is provided by Florax and de Graaff (2004).  
10 Formulae for LM tests can be found in Anselin (2001) and for their robust versions in Florax and de 
Graaff (2004).  
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Robust LM lag 28.61 *** 40.38 *** 73.31 *** 86.04 *** 
I = Distance based neighbour definition; II = Gabriel neighbour definition. 
***p<0,01, **p<0,05, *p<0,10; SE = Standard Error. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Based on non-spatial OLS and instrumental variable estimations, we carry out a series of 
further tests. As discussed earlier, endogeneity of RHS variables arises from three different 
sources (Wooldridge, 2010):  
1. Measurement error: This is the case if we cannot observe the actual explanatory 
variable, but only an imperfect measure of it. This is relevant in our analysis in regard 
to the expectation error with direct payments (Patton et al., 2008). Having 
incomplete foresight, buyers of agricultural land have to form some expectations 
about the magnitude and duration of future payments. Another example in this 
regard is the expectation error about future market returns since, for example, prices 
for outputs and inputs are not known for certain.  
2. Simultaneity: This arises when at least one of the RHS variables is determined 
simultaneously with the LHS variable. In our analysis, this might be the case for 
several RHS variables including the “share of rented agricultural area”, the “price of 
building plots”, and also “direct payments” since the amount of payments is usually 
positively correlated with the quality and therefore the price of land. This problem can 
also evolve from the reduced form nature of our model (see Section 2).  
3. Omitted variables: This is the case if a RHS variable is correlated with a variable that 
influences agricultural land prices but is unavailable in our analysis. Obviously this 
might be the case for all of our RHS variables.  
To detect and to identify appropriate instruments to deal with endogeneity, we apply 
different tests for it and for instrument weakness. The latter is carried out by looking at the 
R2 of the first stage instrumental variable regressions and the Cragg-Donald (1993) statistic 
as proposed by Stock and Yogo (2001).11 We can reject instrument weakness for all our RHS 
variables except for “public authorities as a seller” and “public authorities as a buyer”. Since 
weak instruments can lead to biased inferences on instrument variable estimations, we 
assume them to be exogenous. We extensively test for endogeneity in many different 
combinations of all other potential endogenous variables and instruments in two different 
ways. Using a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, we can test whether a subset of the endogenous 
variables are actually exogenous. This is calculated by running a secondary estimation where 
the test variables are treated as exogenous rather than endogenous, and then comparing the 
J-statistic between this secondary estimation and the original estimation. In addition, we 
apply a regression-based test as discussed in Wooldridge (2010, pp. 119). In a first stage, all 
potentially endogenous explanatory variables of our land price model are regressed on all 
exogenous variables and instruments based on OLS. In a second stage, we estimate our usual 
land price model but include the error term of the first stage regression. A variable is 
endogenous if and only if the added error term has no influence on land prices in the second 
stage. We can test for this with a standard t-test accounting for heterscedasticity in the usual 
manner. We apply tests to all RHS variables of our land price model (except “public authority 
as seller” and “public authority as buyer”) in different combinations of instruments and 
potentially endogenous variables. We obtain a strong indication that the “land quality index” 
is exogenous. This makes perfect sense given that land quality is defined by natural 
conditions completely exogenous to our system, although it does not fit perfectly into the 
expectation error problem with regard to future market returns if the “land quality index” 
serves as a proxy for expected future market returns. We obtain a mixed indication of 
endogeneity for the “ratio of building vs. agricultural land”. It was clearly endogenous in 
                                                        
11 The Cragg-Donald statistic is only valid for TSLS and other K-class estimators. However, results of 
the TSLS and the GMM estimations are very similar in all respects. 
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2007, but exogenous in 2001. We obtain a clear indication of endogeneity for all other 
variables. Given this, we decided to keep “public authorities as a seller”, “public authorities as 
a buyer” and the “land quality index” as exogenous and all other variables endogenous. 
Furthermore, a Breusch-Pagan test clearly indicates heterscedasticity for both years and in a 
Jarque-Bera test we reject the ܪ଴ of normally distributed error terms. 
Given all our tests and considerations above, we estimate a model including endogeneity of 
the spatial lag and of other RHS variables and with heteroscedastic innovations: 
 ࢟ ൌ  ࢅߨ ൅  ࢄߚ ൅  ߛ௪ࢃ࢟ ൅  ݑ  (5) 
 u ൌ  ߛ௘ࢃ࢛ ൅  Ԗ  (6) 
where y is an n × 1 vector of observations on the dependent variable; Y is an n × p matrix of 
observations on p RHS endogenous variables and ߨ is the corresponding p × 1 parameter 
vector; X is an n × k matrix of observations on k RHS exogenous variables and ߚ is the 
corresponding p × 1 parameter vector; W is a n × n spatial-weighting matrix and ߛ௪ and ߛ௘ 
are the corresponding spatial parameters; and Ԗ is an n × 1 vector of independently but 
heteroscedastically distributed innovations (Drukker et al., 2011). 
The model is estimated utilising a GMM estimation strategy as discussed in Kelejian and 
Prucha (e.g. 1999, 2010) and Drukker et al. (2013) consisting of two steps of alternating GM 
and IV estimators each again consisting of sub-steps.12 
Following Bivand and Piras (2013), we use as instruments all exogenous variables (X; public 
authority as seller, public authority as buyer, land quality index), their spatial lags (WX) and 
squared spatial lags (W2X) as well as some additional instruments expected to determine Y 
(two-year lags of direct payments, share of rented agricultural area, the ratio of building vs. 
agricultural land; one-year lag of the price of building plots; municipality averages of 
livestock units per hectare; average size of agricultural land parcels; standard gross margin 
per farm in a municipality).  
5. Results 
Results for the heteroscedasticity-consistent spatial GMM estimator with an endogenous 
spatial lag and additional endogenous variables as described in the last section are reported 
in Table 3 for 2007 and in Table 4 for 2001. These results are based on the distance-based 
spatial weight matrices. We also report non-spatial White heteroskedasticity-consistent OLS 
and GMM estimates for comparison. For both years, the highly significant spatial lag (ߛ௪) 
and spatial error (ߛ௘) coefficients indicate the accuracy of our spatial model. Hence, we 
concentrate on the interpretation of the spatial estimation results. A spatial lag coefficient of 
0.24 (0.33) indicates that agricultural land sales prices in area i increase by about 0.24% 
(0.33%) when sales prices in surrounding areas increase by 1%. In addition, all other model 
parameters are highly significant except for the “distance to the next urban centre” in the 
estimation for 2001.  
Table 3. Regression results for 2007 using non-spatial OLS and GMM and spatial GMM 
with a distance based spatial weight matrix 
OLS GMM 
Spatial GMM 
  coeff.   direct   indirect   total   
Constant         coeff. 5.1998 *** 5.4920 *** 4.2916 ***       
SE 0.3439   0.4346   0.5810        
Public seller 0.2279 *** 0.2214 *** 0.2072 *** 0.2084 *** 0.0669 ** 0.2753 *** 
                                                        
12 We refer to Piras (2010, 2013) for detailed information on the estimator and the implementation 
into R.  
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 0.0501   0.0591   0.0528  0.0530  0.0280  0.0737  
Public buyer  0.3414 *** 0.3368 *** 0.3023 *** 0.3050 *** 0.0975 *** 0.4025 *** 
 0.0254   0.0280   0.0264  0.0264  0.0317  0.0447  
Soil quality rating 0.7996 *** 0.7377 *** 0.6769 *** 0.6819 *** 0.2176 *** 0.8994 *** 
 0.0306   0.0341   0.0367  0.0358  0.0674  0.0723  
Size of transacted 
plot 
0.0275 *** 0.0926 * 0.1061 ** 0.1073 ** 0.0341 * 0.1415 ** 
0.0091   0.0522   0.0484  0.0481  0.0190  0.0640  
Distance to the 
next urban centre 
-0.0610 *** -0.2410 *** -0.1607 *** -0.1611 *** -0.0490 *** -0.2102 *** 
0.0123   0.0376   0.0501  0.0503  0.0165  0.0599  
Direct payments 0.2941 *** 0.4213 *** 0.2094 ** 0.2106 ** 0.0630 *** 0.2736 *** 
 0.0610   0.0767   0.0864  0.0869  0.0265  0.1063  
Share of rented 
agricultural area 
-0.0169 *** -0.0179 *** -0.0132 *** -0.0133 *** -0.0041 *** -0.0174 *** 
0.0009   0.0011   0.0017  0.0017  0.0011  0.0017  
Price of building 
plots 
0.1006 *** 0.0917 *** 0.0499 ** 0.0501 ** 0.0153 *** 0.0655 ** 
0.0153   0.0191   0.0229  0.0230  0.0078  0.0292  
Ratio building vs. 
agricultural land 
0.1702 *** 0.1125 *** 0.1001 *** 0.1008 *** 0.0319 *** 0.1327 *** 
0.0142   0.0242   0.0264  0.0263  0.0125  0.0349  
Spatial lag       0.2428 ***       
       0.0606        
Spatial error        0.1943 **       
          0.0805               
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.4038 
  
0.3547           
***p<0,01, **p<0,05, *p<0,10; SE = Standard Error.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 4. Regression results for 2001 using non-spatial OLS and GMM and spatial GMM 
with a distance based spatial weight matrix 
OLS GMM 
Spatial GMM 
  coeff.   direct   indirect   total   
Constant            coeff. 6.9206 *** 6.2228 *** 3.9200 ***       
SE 0.1618   0.2648   0.6384        
Public seller 0.2605 *** 0.2891 *** 0.2341 *** 0.2374 *** 0.1140 *** 0.3515 *** 
 0.0483   0.0529   0.0435  0.0438  0.0411  0.0729  
Public buyer  0.2562 *** 0.2822 *** 0.2156 *** 0.2192 *** 0.1050 *** 0.3242 *** 
 0.0201   0.0220   0.0200  0.0198  0.0323  0.0394  
Soil quality rating 0.6487 *** 0.6121 *** 0.5868 *** 0.5957 *** 0.2865 *** 0.8822 *** 
 0.0301   0.0327   0.0338  0.0335  0.0895  0.0980  
Size of transacted 
plot 
0.0302 *** 0.2124 *** 0.1404 *** 0.1430 *** 0.0673 ** 0.2103 *** 
0.0100   0.0482   0.0525  0.0538  0.0309  0.0787  
Distance to the next 
urban centre 
-
0.0890 
*** 0.0341   -0.0236  -0.0236  -0.0112  -
0.0348 
 
0.0130   0.0416   0.0459  0.0462  0.0237  0.0691  
Direct payments 0.0616 *** 0.0970 *** 0.0441 * 0.0444 * 0.0201 * 0.0646 * 
 0.0163   0.0179   0.0233  0.0234  0.0113  0.0331  
Share of rented 
agricultural area 
-0.0136 *** -0.0166 *** -0.0104 *** -0.0106 *** -0.0049 *** -0.0155 *** 
0.0010   0.0013   0.0018  0.0018  0.0013  0.0023  
Price of building 
plots 
0.2055 *** 0.2343 *** 0.1215 *** 0.1234 *** 0.0565 *** 0.1799 *** 
0.0153   0.0218   0.0326  0.0328  0.0156  0.0404  
Ratio building vs. 
agricultural land 
0.0502 *** 0.1689 *** 0.0957 *** 0.0973 *** 0.0457 ** 0.1430 *** 
0.0153   0.0246   0.0296  0.0298  0.0180  0.0430  
Spatial lag       0.3290 ***       
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       0.0710        
Spatial error        0.2835 ***       
          0.0740               
Adjusted R-squared 0.3191  0.2303           
***p<0,01, **p<0,05, *p<0,10; SE = Standard Error.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
As discussed earlier, regression coefficients in a spatial lag model cannot be interpreted 
analogously to coefficients obtained from models without a spatial lag. The coefficient of, for 
example, 0.1061 for the “size of the transacted plot” in 2007 only covers the initial effect of a 
change in the plot size. However, an increase in the plot size and the subsequent increase in 
agricultural land prices in area i will also affect agricultural land prices in all neighbouring 
areas j through the spatial lag, and subsequently feeds back to the land price in area i. This 
feedback effect is included in what is usually defined as the “direct effect” in a spatial model 
(LeSage and Pace, 2009). Hence, this direct effect gives the average (over all regions) of the 
impact (including feedbacks) of changing one particular explanatory variable in one region. 
While this might be the appropriate measure to reveal the effect of soil quality rating or the 
size of the transacted plot, it is not appropriate for discussing the impact of a change in direct 
payments, since a policy change will usually occur in all regions. Hence, we have to add the 
effect of a change of direct payments in all neighbouring regions on area i. Those are covered 
by the indirect effect. Therefore, the total effect reports the total average effect of changing, 
for example, direct payments in all regions simultaneously on agricultural land prices in all 
regions.  
All coefficient estimates in Tables 3 and 4 have the expected sign. Interestingly, the 
involvement of public authorities as buyer or seller increases the sales price quite 
substantially: the impact on the average land with a sales price of €21,749 in 2007 (€22,642 
in 2001) is estimated to be 4,532 (5,376) €/ha if a public authority is a seller, and 6,633 
(4,963) €/ha if it is a buyer. Plots with public authority involvement in the transaction are 
more likely to be located in more densely populated areas and land is eventually considered 
for prospective infrastructure development. Another possible explanation for this 
phenomenon could be a downward bias of official land prices when only private parties are 
involved as buyer and seller in order to reduce taxes.  
Our analysis confirms the influence of agricultural factors such as land productivity, of 
variables describing the regional land market structure, and of non-agricultural factors such 
as urban pressure on agricultural land prices. As expected, the soil quality rating has a high 
positive impact on land sales prices, since it is directly connected to productivity. An increase 
in the soil quality rating by 1% will increase the sales price by 0.68% in 2007 (0.60% in 
2001).13 In other words, the difference in sales price between two otherwise identical plots 
with average sales prices, one having an average quality rating of approximately 45.5 in 2007 
(45.2 in 2001) and the other ten points higher, is 3,259 (2,985) €/ha. Similarly, the difference 
between an average plot of 1.76 ha and a 3 ha plot, all other characteristics being equal and 
average, is 1,638 (2,563) €/ha. This positive influence of plot size can be explained by lower 
transaction costs in the transfer and lower operating costs. A 10 km increase in the distance 
to the next urban centre from an average of 29 (29) km to 39 (39) km decreases the price by 
1,208 (184) €/ha. A 10 percentage point increase in the share of rented land from an average 
of 51% (44%) decreases the sales price by 2,884 (2,389) €/ha. The negative impact of a 
higher share of rented land on land sales prices is explained by the substitutive relation 
between renting and buying land. Moreover, land competes with other potential usages, in 
particular housing. Therefore, an increase of the sales price for land for construction from an 
average of 72 (83) €/m2 to € 82 (93) €/m2 increase the sales price of agricultural land by 152 
                                                        
13 In accordance with our discussion above, we use the direct effects to discuss the impact for all 
determinants except direct payments.  
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(336) €/ha. A 1% increase in the ratio of building land to agricultural land increases the sales 
price of land by 0.1% (0.1%).  
With regard to the influence of government support on land prices, a decrease in direct 
payments by 1% will decrease land prices by 0.27% in 2007, but only by 0.06% in 2001. To 
put this into numbers, for land at an average sales value and with average direct payments of 
350 €/ha in 2007 and 261 €/ha in 2001, a decrease of direct payments by 50 €/ha will cause 
the sales price to drop by 849 €/ha and 280 €/ha, respectively. These numbers clearly 
indicate that the capitalisation of government payments into agricultural land prices 
increased between 2001 and 2007. 
Signs, significance levels and, to a great extent, values are not markedly different for non-
spatial estimates. Estimation results for the spatial model with a Gabriel neighbour weight 
matrix are reported in Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix for 2007 and 2001, respectively. 
Results do not differ much, though spatial effects are slightly stronger.  
6. Conclusions 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the main relationships determining agricultural 
land prices in Bavaria. We empirically analyse a dataset of more than 7,300 arm’s length 
agricultural land sales transactions in 2001 and 2007.  
Most of the preceding studies have ignored the spatial dimension of land use and land 
markets. Neglecting spatial relationships can lead to biased coefficient estimates for non-
spatial explanatory variables. Combining a spatial lag model and a spatial error model 
(general spatial model) allows us to account for spatial dependence as well as spatial 
autocorrelation in the disturbances. Additionally, we consider the problem of endogeneity 
introduced by explanatory variables other than the spatially lagged dependent variable, a 
problem usually ignored in spatial econometrics (Fingleton and Le Gallo, 2008).  
Earlier studies (e.g. Barnard et al., 1997; Duvivier et al., 2005) empirically confirmed the 
influence of government support payments on agricultural land prices. Goodwin et al. (2003) 
show that different forms of government support capitalise into agricultural land prices 
differently. According to our findings, a 1% reduction in EU direct payments would lead to a 
decrease in agricultural land prices of 0.27% in 2007 and 0.06% in 2001. Evaluated at mean 
levels, a 50 €/ha reduction in direct payments leads to reductions of 849 €/ha and 280 €/ha, 
respectively. We therefore find a significantly higher capitalisation of government support 
into land after the decoupling of direct payments under the Fischler Reform in 2004. 
Whether the reform or other occurrences are responsible for a larger capitalisation needs 
further inquiry. Apart from direct payments, we find a substantial influence of land 
productivity, urban pressure and regional land market structure on land prices. Our spatial 
results show that land prices increase by about 0.24% when land prices in surrounding areas 
increase by 1%.  
In Bavaria, the share of agricultural land sold every year is relatively low. This might entail an 
unbalanced market structure with a small number of sellers on the one hand, and probably 
multiple potential buyers on the other. Accounting for this potentially imperfect competition 
and its implications for the determinants of agricultural land prices merits future 
investigation. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Regression results for 2007 using spatial GMM with a Gabriel neighbour spatial 
weight matrix 
Spatial GMM 
  coeff.   direct   indirect   total   
Constant                                          coeff. 3.9044 ***       
SE 0.5803        
Public seller 0.2162 *** 0.2170 *** 0.0897 ** 0.3067 *** 
0.0522  0.0529  0.0354  0.0804  
Public buyer  0.2997 *** 0.3021 *** 0.1244 *** 0.4266 *** 
0.0265  0.0268  0.0376  0.0512  
Soil quality rating 0.6720 *** 0.6767 *** 0.2775 *** 0.9541 *** 
0.0365  0.0365  0.0774  0.0799  
Size of transacted plot 0.0989 ** 0.0996 ** 0.0408 * 0.1404 ** 
0.0480  0.0478  0.0234  0.0684  
Distance to the next urban centre -0.1697 *** -0.1699 *** -0.0676 *** -0.2375 *** 
0.0452  0.0455  0.0209  0.0581  
Direct payments 0.2149 ** 0.2154 ** 0.0839 ** 0.2992 *** 
0.0848  0.0851  0.0334  0.1108  
Share of rented agricultural area -0.0123 *** -0.0124 *** -0.0050 *** -0.0174 *** 
0.0017  0.0017  0.0011  0.0017  
Price of building plots 0.0355  0.0355  0.0136  0.0491  
0.0224  0.0228  0.0092  0.0310  
Ratio building vs. agricultural land 0.0827 *** 0.0837 *** 0.0340 ** 0.1177 *** 
0.0251  0.0251  0.0136  0.0356  
Spatial lag 0.2904 ***       
0.0610        
Spatial error  0.1683 **       
  0.0792               
***p<0,01, **p<0,05, *p<0,10; SE = Standard Error.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table A2. Regression results for 2001 using spatial GMM with a Gabriel neighbour spatial 
weight matrix 
Spatial GMM 
  coeff.   direct   indirect   total   
Constant                                       coeff. 3.4648 ***       
SE 0.6487        
Public seller 0.2308 *** 0.2342 *** 0.1536 *** 0.3877 *** 
0.0430  0.0434  0.0541  0.0846  
Public buyer  0.2188 *** 0.2220 *** 0.1452 *** 0.3673 *** 
0.0197  0.0199  0.0434  0.0502  
Soil quality rating 0.5815 *** 0.5900 *** 0.3870 *** 0.9770 *** 
0.0329  0.0329  0.1161  0.1235  
Size of transacted plot 0.1199 ** 0.1221 ** 0.0782 ** 0.2002 ** 
0.0490  0.0497  0.0372  0.0814  
Distance to the next urban centre -0.0581  -0.0595  -0.0392  -0.0986  
0.0449  0.0458  0.0337  0.0775  
Direct payments 0.0420 * 0.0426 * 0.0264 * 0.0689 * 
0.0231  0.0236  0.0154  0.0374  
Share of rented agricultural area -0.0088 *** -0.0090 *** -0.0057 *** -0.0147 *** 
0.0018  0.0018  0.0015  0.0026  
Price of building plots 0.0963 *** 0.0977 *** 0.0602 *** 0.1579 *** 
0.0325  0.0327  0.0184  0.0456  
Ratio building vs. agricultural land 0.0755 *** 0.0767 *** 0.0492 ** 0.1259 *** 
0.0282  0.0288  0.0222  0.0473  
Spatial lag 0.3975 ***       
0.0718        
Spatial error  0.3045 ***       
  0.0768               
***p<0,01, **p<0,05, *p<0,10; SE = Standard Error.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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